The Pretensions of Philosophers (and of everyone else)

My sense is that most philosophers believe or assume that they are in the business of proving, or attempting to prove, some thesis or other. Thus, an ethicist may think they are proving the truth of utilitarianism, or the falsity of Kantianism, or that morality is objective, or that abortion ought to be a woman’s prerogative and society ought to facilitate the means, etc. ad inf. Humility may temper this into a form of fallibilism, according to which they might, despite their confidence in their proof, nevertheless be mistaken. But even then the assumption would be that there is a truth of the matter, and so sooner or later somebody ought to be able to prove it. 

I submit that this assumption is mistaken. Let me caution at once that I am not asserting this as a truth and do not intend to prove it. I am putting it forward as a hypothesis, which I myself happen to believe (although not in the sense of believing it is true but only in the sense that I am motivated to act accordingly,[1] for example, by writing this essay; and, I will add, strongly believe) and can provide reasons for believing, but am fairly confident someone else might disbelieve and with equal sincerity and enthusiasm and rationality (but could never disprove). 

Ultimately I believe, in this same deflated sense of belief, that all beliefs, whether philosophical or scientific or everyday, factual or ethical, etc., could profitably be held in this way. Some reasons (why I believe this, and which might be persuasive to you too) are 

1. Individual beliefs do not stand in a one-to-one correspondence to reality since they are always part of an indefinitely large web of beliefs, perhaps the totality of our beliefs, which at best correspond to reality collectively. Why think that? One way to think about it is that every belief can be articulated in words, but every word is defined in terms of other words. One might then still suppose that any belief that is part of a web that does somehow correspond to reality is true.[2]  My skepticism about that derives from a further consideration, which is that an equally corresponding (or useful – see previous footnote) web of beliefs could be one consisting of (some or all) different beliefs from the given one. But this would seem to mean that different worldviews resulting in different and potentially conflicting motivations could consist of equally true beliefs; but that seems an odd way for truth to function. So perhaps there is no such thing as truth (in this sense … analogous to how a given conception of God would make it implausible that God exists; thus, a different sense of truth might enable us to retain truth, but this would not be the case for my worldview). 

2. This understanding of belief strikes me as explanatory of why philosophical issues (and perhaps all issues) are never finally resolved. 

3. This understanding of belief strikes me as very promising for a welcome[3] change in how philosophy (and all other venues of disputation, from international politics to family relations) could be conducted, namely as the presentation of reasons for what one believes in the sense adumbrated above, namely as opposed to proofs of purported truths. I find it welcome not only because it is a better reflection of how I view the relation of our beliefs to reality but even more because I think it conduces to a less contentious form of determining what to do. Why does that appeal to me? I suppose it’s because I am averse to conflict. But I would further back this up pragmatically with the surmise that less contentious disagreements hold out a better chance of resolving differences in a way that would, in general, be more to everyone’s liking than happens when disputants disagree about what they conceive to be matters of truth.

[1] But is this not to say “as if true”? Since I am not sure that “true” even has a sensical meaning, I hesitate to allow even that. But perhaps it is harmless to speak that way. In that case to believe means to be motivated as if what is believed were true would be analogous to light waves travel through space as if through a substantial ether [which in fact does not exist].

[2] This could be the case even if one’s conception of the relation of true beliefs to reality were purely pragmatic rather than literal correspondence. But then the refutation I will offer could also be in pragmatic terms.

[3] By me, of course, but I suspect many others, and in particular many feminists, at least if they are prepared to apply the same attitude to their belief in feminism itself.

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