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Showing posts from September, 2021

Socratic Egotism

An occupational hazard of being an amoralist and desirist of the type I aspire to be is to be perceived as both an egoist and an egotist. I have discussed the former fallacy a great deal in other places. In a nutshell, the egoism charge rests on a confusion about the nature of selfishness. A person is selfish because they care only or almost exclusively about themself. A desirist could be selfish (like anyone else), but need not be. The defining feature of a desirist is to do that which they most want, all things considered. But an individual desirist could be as compassionate as any moralist. (Indeed, I have argued, there are reasons to think: even more so.) Thus, someone is selfish not because it is they who desire something, but only if what they desire is their own welfare without sufficient regard to the welfare of others. The desire of the most unselfish person in the world is still their desire.             Now I would like to say something about the charge of egotism: of a

On Philosophical Method

Note: What follows is my response to an inquiry out of the blue (i.e., Internet) about philosophical method from one Joseph Forrest.   Herewith some thoughts on philosophical method that result from my own labors in the field. I have come to the conclusion that philosophy is an empirical discipline and not just something you can do  entirely  in your head like math. Philosophy is commonly thought to be primarily conceptual analysis, but my point would be that (1) any empirical inquiry must involve that and (2) conceptual analysis itself is an empirical undertaking. A fabulous example, I think, is the way a planet was eliminated from our solar system without aid of a Death Star -- simply by redefining "planet" in light of new empirical research. For philosophy you need reading (of nonfiction and fiction) and experience and memory, and not just the logical faculty; so when the philosopher sits in his or her armchair, or at their computer, there is a great deal of input from t

An Argument against Truth

Is there some marvelous realm (of truth) where liberal Democrats such as myself are right (correct) and the Republicans are wrong (incorrect)? Is there really some marvelous realm where I am right and my girlfriend is wrong? My feelings say “of course! absolutely!” The very intensity of my feeling tells me this. But so does it them, her. And so long as all of us continue to exist, we are by that very fact vindicated severally … and, collectively, refuted. Let me expand on that with an argument for why asserting truth is misleading and mischievous and dispensable … although believing x or expressing one’s belief that x (unless x is that truth exists) is not or is less so, even granting that believing implies that one is believing that something is true. The issue is whether there can be a pragmatic theory of truth, such that beliefs can be judged true or false by the relative fruitfulness of holding them. There is a simple and obvious fact about the world (or, more precisely, hum