The Philosopher

I am in an odd relationship to truth these days. On one hand I am finding truth to be more and more elusive, to the point where I have doubts about the usefulness of talking about it and even question whether it exists at all. On the other hand I still act and feel as if truth were something I value highly. 

In particular my self identification as a philosopher seems to me to be one with my commitment to truth. The most striking example of this was my suddenly dropping a career as a moralist to become an amoralist, literally in an instant when I had the “anti-epiphany” that moral values are entirely subjective (and so, insofar as morality is conceived as objective, morality does not even exist). This realization had profound and pervasive effects on both my professional work and my personal life. Yet there was not a moment’s hesitation on my part to go wherever my reason led me. Indeed, I have pursued the inquiry with unrelenting vigor to this day, 18 years later. 

And (but?) now I am undergoing the same thing again, this time in the opposite direction: I begin to see how the last two decades of intensive work developing and promoting an amoralist ethics may be nothing but an exercise in self therapy for a peculiar personality (namely, mine) rather than something of genuinely theoretical and practical value for the world. Such a transition has not yet occurred definitively, the way my original “conversion” to amorality did. I still remain very much committed to amoralism. But no matter whether I will finally revert to moralism, or simply moderate my conception of amoralism, or recommit to a thoroughly amoralist ethics, I am, again, “bolding going” wherever my thinking leads me. So it seems to me appropriate to cite this as another instance and evidence of my commitment to truth, come way may for my personal or professional fortunes. (This also suggests that I have a stunningly small amount of ego invested in “being right.” Indeed, my style can be downright confessional.[1]) 

But the oddness I mentioned at the outset is that my rejection of morality has also been leading me to reject truth itself. Or more precisely, what I reject is moralism, which is the psychological embrace of morality (and all of that embrace’s “external” manifestations in personal, social, and institutional settings), and, mutatis mutandis, truthism. For the parallels between the reasons for both rejections became too obvious to ignore. First of all there are powerful (albeit distinct) arguments for the non-existence of both morality and truth. Second, whether or not morality and truth exist, there are powerful arguments for the net noxiousness of believing that they exist.[2] 

Where, then, does this leave my sense of identity as a philosopher? Is it a mistake, analogous to a madman who believes he is a prophet of God? (And does the egolessness of my commitment to truth then turn out to partake of the same egotism with which that prophet claims to be a humble servant of God?) 

Well, first let me note the self denigration (or at least self doubt) I am engaging in. That in itself is an example of my pursuing truth come what may. And that is why I also speak of oddness and irony, since this self denigration is in service of disparaging truth. This is the kind of absurd circularity skeptics always land in, where there assertions of skepticism belie what they are asserting. (And now even my self denigrating smacks of the pride of pursuing truth.) 

I conclude that what must “give” in order to eliminate the absurdity (and so, note, being logical is something else I value) is my conception of the philosopher as a pursuer of truth. Such a conception begs one of the central questions of philosophy, namely: What is truth (including, is it even real)? It is also pompous. So my asserting and even strongly feeling that I am committed to trying to figure out what is true must, if I wish to be consistent (and truly humble), go by the board along with my moralistic feelings of doing the right thing or being a good person. These are all very flattering, but also based on myths. There are more straightforward and mundane ways of describing what defines a philosopher, such as a person who ponders and questions his most fundamental assumptions or, more broadly, a person who is forever pondering and questioning people’s assertions of truth. Otherwise, I’m just this guy, you know? 


[1] Although the very fact that it is may itself be revealing beyond what I intend.

[2] I have spelled out the various arguments at great length in several books, so I won’t go into that here. See especially Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value. (Routledge, 2021)

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