Socratic Egotism

An occupational hazard of being an amoralist and desirist of the type I aspire to be is to be perceived as both an egoist and an egotist. I have discussed the former fallacy a great deal in other places. In a nutshell, the egoism charge rests on a confusion about the nature of selfishness. A person is selfish because they care only or almost exclusively about themself. A desirist could be selfish (like anyone else), but need not be. The defining feature of a desirist is to do that which they most want, all things considered. But an individual desirist could be as compassionate as any moralist. (Indeed, I have argued, there are reasons to think: even more so.) Thus, someone is selfish not because it is they who desire something, but only if what they desire is their own welfare without sufficient regard to the welfare of others. The desire of the most unselfish person in the world is still their desire.

            Now I would like to say something about the charge of egotism: of assuming one’s own paramount importance and superiority. The reason for this fallacy is that the desirist is likely to use the first-person-singular personal pronoun a great deal: “I believe this” or “I don’t believe that”; “I want this” and “I don’t want that”; “I like this” but “I don’t like that,” and so forth. But the reason for this linguistic quirk is precisely the opposite of egotism: It is to decline from asserting things as if they were facts (and hence as if one were in possession of Truth or Righteousness or aesthetic Taste, etc.).

            Thus, my personal self-regard with respect to knowledge has sunk to the bottom. As a desirist my motto is pretty much Socrates’: My wisdom (such as it is) is to know that I know nothing. (And I would add: I’m not even sure about that!)