Outline of the Amoralist/Analethean Project

Amoralism, Stage I 

The essence of amoralism as I conceive it is the recognition that human beings possess a natural tendency to objectify what is in fact subjective, plus the suggestion that this tendency is responsible for life and the world being less to our liking than it would be if we resisted the tendency or discounted its effects. 

Details: 

The objectification is an illusion. 

A moralist (or insofar as a person is moralist) is someone who is taken in by this illusion, that is, who not only experiences the illusion but also fails to recognize that it is an illusion.  In a word, then, the moralist is deluded (in this way or to this extent). 

This illusion or delusion is pervasive in all aspects of mentation or experiencing the world: in believing, desiring, perceiving, valuing, and so forth. Thus for example:

Sensation. A bad smell is a smell that someone does not like (or perhaps that most people do not like), but it is not a(n objective) feature of the smell. Rather it is the (subjective) reaction of the smeller to it. After all, someone else might like the smell, or be indifferent to it, and so form a different judgement. An amoralist would form no judgment at all, but simply like or not like or be indifferent to the smell.

 

Pain. Strictly speaking a toothache is not in the tooth but in the brain. What is in the tooth is decay or some other physiological condition. “Where is the pain?” is a question about an illusion, which can nevertheless serve the useful purpose of directing the doctor to the location of its cause … although there are interesting cases, such as referred pain or phantom limb, where this is misleading (though might still help in locating the cause indirectly). (Another point is that some people like the feeling of a toothache.) Therefore pain is not a(n objective) feature of a decayed tooth; it a (subjective) experience thereof.

 

Morals. There are no bad people or wrong actions but only people and actions some of us don’t like. Therefore moral badness and wrongness (etc.) are not objective features of people and actions (etc.) but rather the (subjective) reactions of people to them.

 

Aesthetics. “The Beatles are the greatest band in history” is just a way of saying that you like the Beatles more than any other band you’ve heard (unless you have some other criterion of band greatness, such as number of people who love their music, which would be an objective measure). Therefore beauty and other qualities we attribute to art (and sometimes also natural) objects (and scenes and events etc.) are not (objective) features of those objects, but our (subjective) responses to them.

My reasons for saying we’d be better off for realizing the illusory nature of our objectifications have been spelled out in various other writings. I won’t repeat or list them here. Suffice to say that they are empirical hypotheses about human beings’ subjective states, such as what sorts of things we prefer (for example, peace instead of strife), or, more precisely, would prefer if we had relevant experience and knowledge and reflected on them rationally. But in the end it does not matter if my empirical predictions are correct – that is, it does not matter to me, so long as I myself continue to be persuaded and moved by the considerations I adduce in making my case. Thus, amoralism is itself subjective, and it would be nothing but moralism to think otherwise. The “products” of philosophizing are just as liable to faux objectification as those of sensation and valuation. The simple reality is that amoralism is my (subjective) response to life and the world as I experience them. It is not a(n objective) feature of the world that we (or even I) would be better off if we (or I) adopted it as our (or my) ethics. Rather it is simply a preference I have formed after much experience, study, and reflection, and one, I suggest as an empirical hypothesis, you would share after a similar process. 

Amoralism, Stage II 

Further reflection has led me to an even more radical conclusion, namely, that truth is as illusory as right and wrong and good and bad and pains in teeth. I still call this “amoralism” because I sense a tendency here that is at least analogous to the objectifying tendency described above, in that both the moralist of Stage I and the truthist of Stage II insist or assume that there is One Right Way (thank you, David Morris) that things are. 

The argument (or explanation) I find persuasive is quite simple. Any assertion that something is true (or false) involves concepts; for example, “God exists” presumes a particular conception of God and a particular conception of existence. So the only way we could have a definitive decision about the truth or falsity of any assertion is by having definitive definitions of all of the relevant concepts (which definitions, note, would themselves consist of yet other concepts facing the same problem). But definitions are just as contestable as the facts that depend on them for their articulation or comprehension. Therefore there is no way to set the meaning of an assertion; therefore there is no way to determine the truth of an assertion. 

Now one might object that this argument is a snake swallowing its own tail, for how could it be asserted as true if it intends to be debunking the very idea of something’s being true? 

Let me handily (however tentatively) answer that objection by saying (but not asserting) that I have not been asserting anything as true, but simply arguing for why I now believe what I believe. 

The objector will answer just as handily that to believe something is to believe it is true. 

But I will handily reply in turn that that begs (i.e., seems to me to beg) the question, since it is in the form of an assertion that presumes that “belief” has a definitive definition or analysis. And that is precisely what I doubt (I won’t say “deny,” which would be an assertion, whereas “doubt” -- or even “don’t believe” -- is simply an expression of my psychological state, which I doubt requires the concept of truth as part of its analysis).

In other words, I view “belief” … and any other word intended to embody a concept … as inherently multiple in meaning. 

The objector replies: Those would just be homonyms, which are different words for different concepts, not a single word with multiple meanings. 

But I think not. Take the present situation. The objector is arguing that I am mistaken to say that belief does not involve truth as part of its analysis. The objector does not appear to be allowing for the possibility that I am using a homonym. 

I, on the other hand, recognize that reference to the relevant literature (or even just a good dictionary) will reveal both the objector’s and my analyses or usages of “belief.” 

Now I do have a preference for mine … and I grant that the objector prefers the other. I only draw the line (by my preference) at insisting that there is One Right Way. This implies that in my scheme of things or meta-worldview, nothing is true (or false) independently of a worldview. I take that as equivalent to saying there is no truth, if by truth is meant something transcendent or absolute. 

But note that even in saying that I am ultimately caught up in verbiage, that is, concepts, that is, indeterminacy of meaning and hence of facts or truth … except in the terms of my worldview, wherein all of the terms (concepts) I am using are interdefined (but, again, by my definition of “definition” … or my conceptualization of conceptualization … and so forth ad inf.). 

A corollary (it seems to me) is that you and I will be forever misunderstanding each other. 

My practical suggestion to help us in this predicament is an extension of the (so-called) desirism I have (elsewhere) recommended for the amoralist of the Stage I variety. Call this beliefism. In sum:

 

Instead of speaking (and thinking) in the language of right and wrong, speak (and think) in the language of desire or preference. (desirism to counter moralizing)

 

Instead of speaking (and thinking) in the language of good and bad, speak (and think) in the language of liking/disliking. (likism to counter evaluating)

 

Instead of speaking (and thinking) in the language of true and false, speak (and think) in the language of belief. (beliefism to counter asserting)

 

And so forth.

Furthermore, in every case (in the ideal and wherever helpful) be prepared to (1) explain what you mean by the terms you are using, (2) give your reasons for preferring those meanings, and (3) give your reasons for preferring or liking or believing what it is that you prefer or like or believe. 

I commend to your further attention this book, which shows in exquisite detail how difficult it is (I would say impossible, although the author would not) to establish truth when conceptual work is part of the task (which is always): 

Pölzler, Thomas. 2018. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences. New York and Abington, Oxon: Routledge 

and this video, which seems to offer no possibility of amelioring our epistemic or communicative situation, but instead seeks to liberate us from even the attempt: Daoist Philosophy: Right & Wrong | Zhuangzi’s Owls and Crows Crave Mice.