Let 100 Flowers Bloom

The amoralist project as I intend it extends beyond morality in the common sense of right and wrong. It includes all presumedly objective (or absolute or categorical) standards. Thus, an amoralist in my sense would dispense with not only right and wrong but also good and bad, beautiful and ugly, funny and flat, logical and illogical, true and false … and when you get right down to it, anything and everything. Yes, my kind of amoralist is a thoroughgoing nihilist. For even to say “That’s a cat” is (as we normally conceive it) to presume that there are definite, objective standards of what counts as a cat. But I doubt this (see my post on “Reality”).

Thus in a sense for me nothing at all exists (including me, of course). But even to say that nothing exists presumes an objective standard or definition of what it means to exist. So a better formulation might be the Buddhistic one: “The cat neither exists nor does not exist.” (This makes it sound like the condition of Schrödinger’s cat, whose states of living and not living are in quantum superposition.) But even that is an assertion. And so ultimately one may be reduced to silence … or only speaking nonsense (these also being Buddhist practices).

My argument for this outlandish thesis (if I can call something a thesis that perhaps cannot even be stated) is, in broad brush, simple:

Premise 1: In order to determine whether something is, existentially speaking (i.e., whether it exists or has a certain property), one needs to know what that something is, conceptually speaking (i.e., what is the meaning or definition or analysis of the word for it or for the property in question). Examples:

Do unicorns exist? No if “unicorn” means a horse with a horn on its forehead. Yes if “unicorn” means an animal with a horn on its forehead. (Also, yes if “exists” means has a definite description in the human imagination, as in “Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus.”)

Does God exist? No if God is (conceptually speaking) a being who is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing (since the world as we know it is not compatible with the existence of such a being). Yes if “God” means the mystery of existence (Why is there something rather than nothing?).

Is Pluto a planet? Yes if a planet is a large spherical body revolving around a star. No if a planet is a spherical body revolving around a star and large enough to gravitationally clear its orbital region of most or all other celestial bodies.

Premise 2: The meanings (or definitions or analyses) of all words or concepts are perennially contested. (In “Reality” and Chapter 1 of my book Reason and Ethics I offer an explanation of why this is the case.)

Conclusion: No issue (conceptual or otherwise) can ever be resolved (including this one).

However, it seems to me, it does not follow from this that no one can ever believe or act rationally. It would only mean that one can be rational without the imprimatur of truth. And that strikes me as not only plausible, but the very point of having a notion of rationality. For if we could simply grok truth, why would we need to reason? We reason precisely because truth is elusive. Thus does a standard definition of knowledge as rational true belief imply the mutual independence of rationality and truth. We can irrationally believe something that is true (The ancient prophet who believed the Earth is round because of a fantastic dream she had), and rationally believe something that is false (The student who believed that Pluto was a planet because all the astronomers said it was).

This suggests that my thesis amounts to a universal skepticism (including about skepticism). In that way even analetheism and nihilism are off the table except as an informal way of saying, “Live as if nothing could ever be known to be true or false or to exist or not exist, etc.” (I say “as if” in order to avoid asserting skepticism. And the injunction to live this way is intended only as a rational recommendation, not as a command.)

But what, then, does it mean to be rational? Well, of course, all I can do is give you my own opinion on the subject and explain in a way that might have some appeal to you why I hold it. (And that is itself an instance of my way of being rational.) So here goes. To be rational is always to be prepared to do the following regarding what you claim or believe (or do or feel or desire on the basis of what you believe):

1.     Explain what you mean by the words or concepts that comprise your claim.

2.   Give your reason(s) for those definitions or analyses.

3.   Give your reason(s) for your claim.

4.   Entertain objections to your reasons for your claim and definitions, as well as arguments (reasons) for opposing claims and definitions.

5.   Reply to those objections or object to those arguments.

For example, you aren’t rationally supporting your claim that Rover is a cat by arguing that Rover barks (Step 3. above) and then simply declaring that cats are the only animals that bark (Step 1. above). You would need also, for starters, to give a convincing reason for that definition of “cat” (Step 2. above).

As far-fetched as that example may seem, it is representative of a commonplace way of arguing. Thus, the animal experimenters at a major research institution with which I have some affiliation used to claim that their research was humane. To me this was as absurd as claiming that Rover is a cat. I was able to obtain an audience with these researchers and asked them what they meant by “humane.” We discussed this, including their reasons (Steps 1 and 2. above). They argued that “humane” means taking all due care of the animals compatibly with the aims of science, and that this definition is justified because it conforms to existing regulations.

So I objected that this in effect permitted any procedures whatsoever, and that some of those procedures clearly violate accepted norms of humaneness (since otherwise there would be no norms at all). I found their definition of “humane” to be as absurd as the definition of “cat” as the animal that barks. So why would someone even propose such a definition? Well, in the case of Rover, maybe Rover’s owner was trying to circumvent a prohibition of dogs in their apartment complex. In the case of animal experimentation, clearly there is an incentive to win public approval for the work in a society that purports to oppose animal cruelty. Indeed, that would be the “argument” for the original claim that animal experimentation is humane (Step 3. above). But it falls apart if the definition of “humane” it presumes is bogus.

I also offered an argument for a different definition of humane, namely, what you would permit to be done to your pet. My “argument” here was simply to invite them to consult their own linguistic intuition.

They heard me out (Step 4. above) and, unable to counter my arguments or objections (Step 5. above), thereafter stopped claiming that their research was humane (see Chapter 9 of Reason and Ethics). They were being rational according to my conception of rationality.

Had I thereby established that animal experimentation (as they practice it) is not humane? Certainly not. But truth did not have to enter the picture in order for us to have a rational conversation and form rational opinions and then act rationally (and even that, again, is conditional on my conception of rationality).

Thus can a total skeptic live in the world.